1. The remedies available to an accused when the Crown loses or damages relevant evidence can be seen to flow from three landmark cases with which all competent criminal lawyers are already quite familiar: Stinchcombe (1991) 2 ; O’Connor (1995) 3 ; and Carosella (1997) 4 .
Each case touches upon broad themes in criminal justice: the notion of full answer and defence; the right to disclosure or to production; the duties of the Crown and the police to preserve and disseminate documentary evidence; and the sense of fair play that underlies or ought to underlie our system of Canadian justice.
You cram these words into mine ears against the stomach of my sense.
The co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule permits the acts, declarations, statements or utterances of an accused’s alleged co-conspirators, performed or made in furtherance of a conspiracy, to be presented as evidence against the accused as proof of his or her guilt. Declarations and acts are treated equally.
The Rationale for the Rule
The Rule is based upon principles of agency. Each member of a common unlawful scheme impliedly permits every other member of the unlawful scheme the right to act or speak on her behalf in pursuit of the common unlawful plan.
It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of the needle,
than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.
Matthew’s solemn admonition to the Christian believer about how difficult it is to achieve the heavenly kingdom may strike some as an odd passageway into a discussion of R. v. Heideman 1 , a relatively recent decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario. But for me the Heideman case has such thundering implications that the scriptural analogy does not seem to be all that far-fetched. I tell you, sisters and brothers, that after Heideman it will be easier for defence counsel to go through the eye of the needle than to get an acquittal on the charge of exceeding the breathalyzer if the defence relies upon what is commonly referred to as “evidence to the contrary.”
The defence of “evidence to the contrary” invariably includes evidence about how much alcohol the accused consumed and expert opinion evidence showing that his or her blood alcohol concentration level (“BAC”) at the time of driving was less than 80 milligrams in 100 milliliters of blood. This defence, often referred to in Ontario as the Carter 2 defence, has abided for nearly twenty years. Some of the hallowed principles set out in Carter include: Continue reading “After Heideman: Re-Defining “Evidence to the Contrary””
By Patrick Ducharme, prepared for the Ontario Bar Association’s 2005 Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Toronto, Ontario
My task today is to address evidentiary issues generally considered unique or at least important to drug cases. The best and most obvious place to begin is with the empowering statute, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (the “CDSA”) Proclaimed into force in May, 1997, the CDSA codifies all drug offences in Canada.
The Concept of Possession
Included in the CDSA are six Schedules identifying all the particular substances
and precursors declared illegal by this legislation. In section 2, the definitions section, possession is defined as meaning “possession” within the meaning of subsection 4(3) of the Criminal Code. 3 Consequently, we look to that provision for our definition:
By Patrick Ducharme prepared for the L.S.U.C Continuing Legal Education program “Recent Issues and Developments In Criminal Law” September 6, 1997.
The common thread running through the topics presented here is that each in its own way deals with the problem of separating truth from falsehood or, better, the perception of truth from the perception of falsehood. And although the evidentiary issues relating to these topics are many and sometimes complicated, skillful counsel inevitably demonstrate mastery in understanding and applying them in individual circumstances.